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NOTE 
REVIVING ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN THE AIRLINE 
INDUSTRY 
Jonathan Edelman * 
The Department of Transportation (DOT) has broad but oft overlooked power 
to address antitrust issues among airlines through section 411 of the Federal 
Aviation Act. However, the DOT’s unwillingness to enforce antitrust more ag-
gressively may be translating into higher fares and fees for airline travelers. 
More aggressive antitrust enforcement is urgently needed. Recent research has 
revealed a widespread practice of common ownership in the airline industry, 
whereby investment firms own large portions of rival airline companies. Alt-
hough this practice leads to higher prices and reduced competition, antitrust 
regulators, from the DOT to the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission, have declined to take action. This Note argues that the DOT has 
the clear legal authority—and the responsibility—under section 411 to address 
common ownership among airlines by promulgating a rule that limits inves-
tors’ ability to own large shares of multiple airlines. DOT regulation in this 
area could pave the way for more muscular antitrust regulation among indus-
try-specific agencies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Much ink has been spilled on how airline mergers have affected competi-
tion. 1 Mergers have cut major carriers nearly in half over the past two decades. 
From Southwest–Air Tran and Delta–Northwest to United–Continental and 
American–US Airways, mergers have increased travel costs and reduced trav-
elers’ options. 2 But airline mergers only tell part of the story. Despite their far-
reaching impact, less has been written about how mergers of financial institu-
tions affect the airline industry. When financial institutions BlackRock and 
BGI merged, ticket prices increased by 0.5% across the industry.3 New re-
search on that merger and others has brought to light the investment practice 
of “common ownership,” which involves investors owning large shares of 
stock in multiple rival companies. Common ownership stifles market compe-
tition, particularly in the airline industry. 
 
 1. See, e.g., Ben Mutzabaugh, Era of Airline Merger Mania Comes to a Close with Last US 
Airways Flight, USA TODAY (Oct. 16, 2015, 10:22 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel
/flights/todayinthesky/2015/10/15/airline-mergers-american-delta-united-southwest/73972928 
[perma.cc/W7KT-5PRA]. This Note discusses only passenger airlines. 
 2. See, e.g., Haobin Fan, When Consumer Type Matters: Price Effects of the United-Con-
tinental Merger in the Airline Industry, 21 ECON. TRANSP., Mar. 2020. 
 3. José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive Effects of Common Own-
ership, 73 J. FIN. 1513, 1541 (2018). 
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Common ownership has exploded across the economy over the past two 
decades.4 In 2000, institutional investors5 were the largest owners of 25% of 
the companies listed on the S&P 500 index; by 2017, that number was up to 
90%.6 By 2010, over half of American public companies had large portions of 
their stock held by common owners, up from 10% in 1980.7 Furthermore, 
common ownership appears to have increased prices for consumers across 
several industries—including banking, tech, pharmacy retail, and air travel.8 
The practice may be costing consumers and society over $60 billion, repre-
senting a significant transfer of wealth from consumers to upper-class inves-
tors.9 But the rise of common ownership has not persuaded regulators to act. 
Fearful of harming financial markets and overstepping their legal authority, 
regulators have responded only by calling for further research.10 
This Note proposes a solution to these concerns. As the larger antitrust 
agencies—the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC)—continue to sit on the sidelines, the Department of Transporta-
tion (DOT) can and should take action against common ownership. By 
regulating common ownership of airlines under the broad antitrust jurisdic-
tion of the DOT, federal authorities can enact a workable solution without 
putting financial markets at risk, all while grounding that regulation in clear 
legal authority. This will require that the DOT go beyond usual antitrust reg-
ulation and embrace its broad legal mandate to prevent methods of unfair 
competition. In doing so, the DOT could pave the way both for other agencies 
to regulate common ownership across the economy and for the DOT itself to 
engage in farther-reaching antitrust enforcement that fulfills its statutory 
mandate. 
 
 4. Miguel Antón, Florian Ederer, Mireia Giné & Martin Schmalz, Common Ownership, 
Competition, and Top Management Incentives 19–20 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance 
Working Paper No. 511/2017, 2021), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2802332 [perma.cc/KE6U-
S447]. 
 5. Institutional investors are entities that pool large amounts of money for investment, 
such as mutual funds, pensions, and insurance companies. James Chen, Institutional Investor, 
INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/institutionalinvestor.asp 
[perma.cc/6XXU-RE8N]. 
 6. Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anti-
competitive Power of Institutional Investors, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 674 (2017). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Einer Elhauge, Essay, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2016). 
 9. Posner et al., supra note 6, at 679; Our Curious Amalgam, From Virtual Spring Meet-
ing: Common Minority Interests: Major or Minor Problem?, A.B.A., at 12:05 (May 27, 2020) 
[hereinafter Common Minority Interests], https://podcast.ourcuriousamalgam.com/episode/62-
common-minority-interests-major-minor-problem [perma.cc/HL2E-NFV8]. 
 10. Noah Joshua Phillips, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at FTC Hear-
ing #8: Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century 11 (Dec. 6, 2018) [hereinafter 
FTC Hearing], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/1422929/ftc_hear-
ings_session_8_transcript_12-6-18_0.pdf [perma.cc/AVW3-KC5V]. 
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The DOT’s regulation of common ownership and other anticompetitive 
practices may affect not only how the airline industry might function but also 
how the economy as a whole distributes income and wealth.11 As the United 
States creeps toward its highest levels of economic inequality in a century,12 
policymakers, politicians, and activists have started to identify ineffective an-
titrust laws as one cause of that inequality.13 But their proposed remedies tend 
to focus solely on using the DOJ and the FTC to strengthen merger enforce-
ment and break up monopolies.14 Less attention has been paid to how anti-
trust law can more effectively check anticompetitive practices, and less still to 
where industry-specific agencies like the DOT fit in. By considering the DOT’s 
potential for stronger enforcement, this Note paves the way for more effective 
antitrust regulation across the economy. 
Part I introduces background concepts in antitrust law, airline-specific 
antitrust law, and the airline industry’s competitive landscape—including the 
presence of common ownership. Part II explains how antitrust law may pre-
vent the larger antitrust agencies from issuing proactive regulations on com-
mon ownership, as well as how historical practice has caused antitrust 
practitioners to overlook the DOT’s potential role in antitrust enforcement. 
Part III proposes that the DOT use its authority to combat common owner-
ship and shows why the DOT should take a more active role in regulating an-
ticompetitive business practices in the airline industry. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE ANTITRUST REGULATORY STRUCTURE OF AIRLINES 
This Part provides an overview of the airline industry and the legal struc-
ture governing competition within the industry. Section I.A briefly summa-
rizes antitrust law generally. Section I.B describes the specific structure of 
antitrust regulation of airlines. Section I.C explains the main competitive fea-
tures of the airline industry, including common ownership and its application 
to airlines. 
 
 11. Posner et al., supra note 6, at 679. 
 12. See, e.g., CHAD STONE, DANILO TRISI, ARLOC SHERMAN & JENNIFER BELTRÁN, CTR. 
ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, A GUIDE TO STATISTICS ON HISTORICAL TRENDS IN INCOME 
INEQUALITY (2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/a-guide-to-statis-
tics-on-historical-trends-in-income-inequality [perma.cc/F7GY-WG56]. 
 13. See, e.g., Roger McNamee, Opinion, A Historic Antitrust Hearing in Congress Has Put 
Big Tech on Notice, GUARDIAN (July 31, 2020, 7:42 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/com-
mentisfree/2020/jul/31/big-tech-house-historic-antitrust-hearing-times-have-changed [perma.cc
/B6K7-MYGH]; Kelly Evans, Big Tech’s “Big Tobacco” Moment, CNBC: THE EXCHANGE (July 
29, 2020, 11:19 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/29/kelly-evans-big-techs-big-tobacco-
moment.html [perma.cc/62CS-ASZ3]. 
 14. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren (@teamwarren), Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, 
MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-
tech-9ad9e0da324c [perma.cc/A7EJ-D7FT]. 
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A. Overview of Antitrust Law 
Antitrust law allows government regulators and private parties to restrict 
company behavior that produces monopolies or otherwise interferes with 
competitive markets.15 Most antitrust enforcement comes from two agencies: 
the DOJ and the FTC.16 The DOJ’s antitrust jurisdiction stems from two in-
dustrialization-era statutes, the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.17 The Sher-
man Act contains two main sections that provide a broad outline of antitrust 
law: section 1 prohibits anticompetitive agreements and mergers,18 while sec-
tion 2 prohibits anticompetitive behavior by a single company.19 The Clayton 
Act provides mechanisms for enforcing the Sherman Act, including provi-
sions for treble damages, prohibitions on stock acquisition, and regulatory re-
view of mergers.20 
The exact scope of the Sherman and Clayton Acts is often in dispute. 
Though it is clear that the Acts apply when business conduct directly and im-
mediately raises prices, judges and practitioners often disagree on their ap-
plicability when the conduct has an attenuated effect on competition, affects 
outcomes outside of price, or stems from interrelated markets.21 This Note 
will not attempt to resolve that disagreement, but it will consider how federal 
enforcement agencies respond when it is not clear whether the Acts cover cer-
tain business practices. This Note refers to this liminal space as the “bounda-
ries” of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, where DOJ jurisdiction is disputed. 
The FTC’s jurisdiction over antitrust stems from section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), another century-old statute that allows the 
 
 15. See EINER ELHAUGE, UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 1–4 (3d ed. 
2018). A monopoly occurs when one company is so dominant compared to its rivals that it can 
raise prices on its products or services without its customers leaving for its rivals. See id. The 
market—that is, the different items people are willing to substitute for the original item—can be 
defined in several ways, often for the same product. For example, a soccer podcaster may have 
one market for her podcast in “podcast lovers,” where she competes with other podcasts for 
downloads and listens. She may have another market for that same podcast in “soccer lovers,” 
where she competes with other soccer journalists who post blogs and record TV interviews. And 
if her podcast is about soccer analytics, she may even have a smaller market in “soccer analytics 
fans,” where she competes only with other journalists who engage in soccer analytics. The mar-
ket definition depends solely on what the customer is willing to substitute. 
 16. Id. at 11. 
 17. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7; Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53. 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 1. In the modern antitrust context, “anticompetitive” means a business 
practice that, on balance, does more to harm a business’s current and potential rivals than it does 
to help that business develop a better or more efficient product or service. See ELHAUGE, supra 
note 15, at 54–55. Anticompetitive behavior often—but not always—results in a company raising 
its prices without providing value for their customers. See id. at 1–2. 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
 20. See id. §§ 15, 18. 
 21. See ELHAUGE, supra note 15, at 274–355 (discussing disagreement over what consti-
tutes “anticompetitive conduct” in doctrines such as predatory pricing and refusals to deal). See 
also infra note 120 for a discussion of predatory pricing. 
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FTC to prohibit “unfair methods of competition.”22 The FTC’s antitrust en-
forcement authority under section 5 is at least as broad as the DOJ’s authority 
under the Sherman and Clayton Acts.23 Section 5 also gives the FTC authority 
over consumer protection24 as well as some antitrust issues not covered by the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts, though exactly which issues are covered is not 
clearly defined.25 
B. Antitrust Enforcement Within the Airline Industry 
As explained above, the DOJ and the FTC jointly enforce federal antitrust 
laws in most industries. But because the DOT is broadly responsible for regu-
lating air travel, the DOT enforces the antitrust laws in the airline industry, 
not the FTC.26 The role of these agencies has changed significantly over time. 
This Section focuses on the source and scope of the DOT’s authority. 
The airline industry went from strict federal control to relatively lax reg-
ulation in the late twentieth century. Airlines used to be tightly regulated: the 
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) had broad authority to set airline routes and 
prices for airlines, which effectively capped the number of airlines that could 
stay in business.27 But in 1978, Congress removed most government controls 
over prices and routes with the Airline Deregulation Act.28 Upon the CAB’s 
disbandment in 1985, its powers to monitor anticompetitive practices and 
 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a); ELHAUGE, supra note 15, at 12–13; see also Clayton Act § 11, 15 
U.S.C. § 21 (granting the FTC enforcement authority). 
 23. See FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 422 (1990) (noting that con-
duct violating the Sherman Act consequently “also violated . . . § 5”); ELHAUGE, supra note 15, 
at 13 (“[A]nything that violates the Sherman Act could also be deemed an unfair method of 
competition actionable under FTC Act § 5.”). 
 24. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 245–46 (1972); see also Cindy R. Al-
exander & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Economics of Regulatory Reform: Termination of Airline Com-
puter Reservation System Rules, 21 YALE J. ON REGUL. 369, 383 (2004). 
 25. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986) (“[Section 5] encom-
pass[es] not only practices that violate the Sherman Act and other antitrust laws but also prac-
tices that the Commission determines are against public policy for other reasons.” (citation 
omitted)); C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rule-
making to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 676 (2009). The limits of section 
5 of the FTC Act are explored infra in Section II.B. 
 26. Clayton Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 21. In contrast to the FTC, the DOJ retains jurisdiction 
over the airline industry. ELHAUGE, supra note 15, at 11 & n.5. 
 27. See Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, U.S. Airlines and Antitrust: The Struggle for 
Defensible Policy Towards a Unique Industry, 50 IND. L. REV. 539, 541–42 (2017); see also 
TRANSP. RSCH. BD., NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, WINDS OF CHANGE: DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORT 
SINCE DEREGULATION 22–28 (1991), https://doi.org/10.17226/11410 [perma.cc/TP8G-DCHP]. 
Though the CAB was in charge of economic regulation, safety was controlled by the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), which was housed within the DOT. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Civ. 
Aeronautics Bd., 543 F.2d 247, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 28. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
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mergers, as well as its consumer protection authorities, were transferred to the 
DOT.29 The DOT ceded jurisdiction of mergers to the DOJ in 1989 after the 
DOT was criticized for rubber-stamping merger applications.30 
The DOT’s jurisdiction over airline competition comes from section 411(a) 
of the Federal Aviation Act. That statute allows the DOT to “investigate and 
decide whether an air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent has been or is 
engaged in an unfair or deceptive practice or an unfair method of competition 
in air transportation or the sale of air transportation.”31 Section 411(a) is nearly 
identical in language to section 5 of the FTC Act. Accordingly, the DOT’s 
competition authority has been interpreted together with that of the FTC.32 
C. Overview of the Airline Industry and Common Ownership 
Antitrust law works by tailoring regulations to the competitive nature of 
each specific market.33 This Section covers three aspects of the U.S. airline in-
dustry that structure competition: oligopoly, differentiation between low-cost 
and legacy carriers, and common ownership. Exploring these features reveals 
how firms interact with each other and consumers and leads to a better un-
derstanding of how antitrust enforcement can and cannot protect consumers 
from anticompetitive practices. 
 
 29. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Civ. Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d 1107, 1112 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(Posner, J.); see also Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 27, at 553–54. Though the FAA is part of the 
DOT, economic regulation of airlines is handled by the Office of the Secretary—a remnant of 
the old division between the CAB and the FAA. See, e.g., Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair 
Exclusionary Conduct in the Air Transportation Industry, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,919 (proposed Apr. 
10, 1998) (proposing a rule by the Office of the Secretary to regulate airline pricing). 
 30. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Regulatory Schizophrenia: Mergers, Alliances, Metal-Neu-
tral Joint Ventures and the Emergence of a Global Aviation Cartel, 83 J. AIR L. & COM. 3, 20 (2018) 
(“[T]he USDOT never met a merger it did not like, approving each of the twenty-one merger 
applications submitted to it, even those to which the DOJ vigorously objected . . . .”); Jesse Her-
cules, Mixed Optimization: Diagnosis and Proposed Solution for Several Problems in the Airline 
Industry, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 691, 702–03 (2006). The DOT retains the ability to exempt inter-
national airline agreements from the antitrust laws, but those are outside the scope of this Note. 
49 U.S.C. § 41308; see 4 JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI, PETER SULLIVAN & MAUREEN MCGUIRL, 
ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 67.02(1)(b) (2d ed. 2020). 
 31. 49 U.S.C. § 41712(a). DOT jurisdiction also comes from the policy goals specified in 
49 U.S.C. § 40101(a), which include preventing anticompetitive practices and concentration. 
 32. United Air Lines, 766 F.2d at 1112–13; Ernest Gellhorn & Richard Liebeskind, Com-
puter Reservations Systems: To Regulate or Not? Flawed DOT Jurisdiction and Antitrust Ra-
tionale, AIR & SPACE LAW., Spring 2003, at 1, 21; see also infra Section II.B. 
 33. See, e.g., Royce Zeisler, Note, Chevron Deference and the FTC: How and Why the FTC 
Should Use Chevron to Improve Antitrust Enforcement, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 266, 269. 
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First, the airline industry is an oligopoly.34 In an oligopoly, the market is 
dominated by a small number of firms.35 Firms have market power (that is, 
the power to reap profits above competitive levels by setting prices and quan-
tities), but that power is constrained by other firms in the market.36 Accord-
ingly, oligopolists have incentives to preserve their market power strategically 
and reduce competition, often by cooperating with other firms or by driving 
other firms out of the market.37 As a market becomes more concentrated—
that is, as fewer firms control more of the market—firms have even greater 
incentives to preserve their market power.38 
The U.S. airline oligopoly is dominated by four firms: American, United, 
Delta, and Southwest, which together make up about two-thirds of the mar-
ket.39 Competition generally takes place along individual “city pairs,” or flights 
from one specific city to another, like Jacksonville to D.C. or Detroit to Ra-
leigh. The market within each city pair is often more concentrated than the 
airline market as a whole.40 Further, the market within each hub is especially 
concentrated, and flights to or from hubs are more expensive than those to or 
from non-hub airports.41 Further, it is difficult for airlines to compete in new 
city pairs: fixed costs (like buying planes) are high,42 flight schedules must be 
planned months in advance,43 and airport space must be leased before flights 
 
 34. E.g., Larry Moore, Rose M. Rubin & Justin N. Joy, The World Trade Center Disaster: 
How Terrorist Airline Attacks Can Affect the Legal, Economic, and Financial Conditions of Air-
lines Under the Montreal Liability Agreement, 4 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV., no. 1, 2007, at 1, 9; 
see, e.g., Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Coun-
terrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 260–61 (2017). 
 35. Moore et al., supra note 34; Oligopoly, ECON. ONLINE, https://www.econom-
icsonline.co.uk/Business_economics/Oligopoly.html [perma.cc/YTT5-FFMN]. 
 36. Moore et al., supra note 34; Oligopoly, supra note 35. 
 37. Oligopoly, supra note 35. For more on how firms use business strategy to preserve 
their market power, see generally William S. Comanor & H.E. Frech III, Strategic Behavior and 
Antitrust Analysis, 74 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 372 (1984). 
 38. Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 34, at 261; Moore et al., supra note 34, at 8. 
 39. Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 34, at 260; Elena Mazareanu, Domestic Market Share of 
Leading U.S. Airlines from January to December 2020, STATISTA (Mar. 16, 2021), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/250577/domestic-market-share-of-leading-us-airlines 
[perma.cc/Z2QD-UB8S]. 
 40. See TRANSP. RSCH. BD., NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, ENTRY AND COMPETITION IN THE U.S. 
AIRLINE INDUSTRY: ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES 65–67 (1999); Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 34, 
at 260–61. For example, the Detroit to Raleigh city-pair would have even fewer competitors than 
the market as a whole. 
 41. TRANSP. RSCH. BD., supra note 40, at 66–72. Examples of hubs include Dallas (Amer-
ican) and Atlanta (Delta). Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 34, at 262. 
 42. Moore et al., supra note 34, at 10 (noting that 75% of airlines’ cost structure is fixed). 
High fixed costs are often associated with oligopolies. Oligopoly, supra note 35. 
 43. Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 27, at 544. 
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can operate.44 Since it is more difficult for would-be rivals to compete in new 
markets, this lack of flexibility allows airlines to maintain their market power 
in the city pairs they control.45 These concentrating effects incentivize airlines 
to cooperate and otherwise act strategically to increase market power. 
Second, the airline industry is characterized by competition between “leg-
acy” and “low-cost” carriers. Legacy carriers offer more full-service options, 
such as an extensive flight network (connected through hubs) and first-class 
seating. Low-cost carriers offer smaller flight networks with fewer connecting 
flights and cheaper fares.46 Low-cost carriers have disrupted legacy carriers’ 
hub-based business models, meaning that competition—and attempts to un-
dermine it—is often fiercest when legacy and low-cost carriers compete in the 
same city pairs.47 
Finally, the airline industry has high levels of common ownership. Com-
mon ownership refers to a phenomenon in finance whereby the same inves-
tor—often an institutional investor that manages mutual funds for millions of 
clients (think BlackRock or Berkshire Hathaway)—holds a significant stake in 
multiple firms in the same industry.48 Investors who own a stake in two rivals 
would prefer for those rivals to cooperate rather than compete. As a result, 
both economic theory49 and recent empirical research 50 suggest that common 
ownership leads to reduced competition between firms—to the detriment of 
consumers. Antitrust scholar Einer Elhauge explains that “[d]ozens of empir-
ical studies have now confirmed” that common ownership affects how com-
panies make decisions, which often causes anticompetitive effects.51 
 
 44. Id. at 555 (noting the practice of airlines hoarding airport space to prevent rivals from 
entering). 
 45. Oligopoly, supra note 35 (explaining that barriers to entry into new markets allow ex-
isting firms to maintain market power and keep an oligopolistic structure). 
 46. Legacy carriers (Delta, American, and United) are known as such because they existed 
before Congress deregulated the industry. Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 27, at 542 & n.34. 
 47. Id. at 550–51; see also Paul Stephen Dempsey, Predation, Competition & Antitrust 
Law: Turbulence in the Airline Industry, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 685, 698 (2002). 
 48. Azar et al., supra note 3, at 1514. For example, an investor in Firm A would want her 
firm to undercut Firm B’s prices whenever profitable, even if that undercutting would destroy 
Firm B’s profits. Undercutting prices in this way would benefit consumers, who could take ad-
vantage of a lower price. But if the investor owned stakes in both Firm A and Firm B, then she 
would prefer Firm A to undercut Firm B’s prices only when it would not destroy Firm B’s profits, 
since she cares about the aggregate profits of Firm A and Firm B. Consumers would lose if the 
investor got her way because prices would remain high. 
 49. Id. at 1514. 
 50. Posner et al., supra note 6, at 669; Common Minority Interests, supra note 9, at 1:05:30. 
 51. Elhauge, supra note 8, at 3. Elhauge goes on to note that “[o]nly two of these empirical 
studies have been disputed, and the critiques of those two studies have been rebutted at length.” 
Id. at 3–4. Some have taken issue with this characterization, pointing out methodological ques-
tions with the empirical studies and arguing that many of the studies cited show influences on 
corporate behavior, rather than anticompetitive effects specifically. C. Scott Hemphill & Marcel 
Kahan, The Strategies of Anticompetitive Common Ownership, 129 YALE L.J. 1392, 1447 n.154 
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The airline industry is a paradigmatic example of the problems associated 
with common ownership.52 Almost all of the largest owners of the major air-
lines are common owners, and the ten largest stockholders of the four biggest 
airlines have surprising overlap.53 For example, in 2016 Berkshire Hathaway 
was the largest shareholder of both Delta (8%) and United (9%), the second-
largest of Southwest (7%), and the third-largest of American (8%).54 Mutual-
fund giant Vanguard had significant shares in all eight of the largest airlines: 
it was the largest shareholder of JetBlue (8%), the second-largest of Spirit (7%), 
third-largest of United (7%), Delta (6%), and Southwest (6%), and fourth-
largest of American (6%) and Allegiant (7%).55 
This extensive network of common ownership is harming competition. A 
2018 study found that common ownership of airlines caused a 3%–7% in-
crease in airline fares on average, with fare increases perhaps as high as 12%.56 
As with any market, as prices increase, fewer people will fly: if the price of a 
flight from Baltimore to Atlanta rises from $199 to $220, some will find the 
new price too costly and stay on the ground.57 These price increases also trans-
fer wealth from consumers to airlines; when travelers have to pay more for 
each flight, they must spend more every year on air travel, while airlines keep 
that extra money as profits.58 
Competition in the airline industry, then, occurs across an oligopolistic 
structure, where legacy airlines and low-cost carriers compete most fiercely. 
Partly because of the oligopolistic nature of the market, common ownership 
 
(2020); Patrick Dennis, Kristopher Gerardi & Carola Schenone, Common Ownership Does Not 
Have Anti-competitive Effects in the Airline Industry, SSRN (Mar. 9, 2021), 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3063465 [perma.cc/FZT7-KDLH]. Resolving econometric disputes 
is well beyond the scope of this Note; however, some of the studies critiquing Azar et al., supra 
note 3, have themselves come under criticism for fabricating data. See, e.g., Martin Schmalz 
(@martincschmalz), TWITTER (June 26, 2020, 3:53 AM), https://twitter.com/mar-
tincschmalz/status/1276423263258923008 [perma.cc/MUZ4-2YMG] (critiquing Edward B. 
Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Antitrust for Institutional Investors, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 221, 271 
(2018), for arbitrary use of dummy variables); Martin Schmalz (@martincschmalz), TWITTER 
(July 20, 2020, 10:21 AM), https://twitter.com/martincschmalz/status/1285218246136860672 
[perma.cc/FK5R-FGV5] (accusing Dennis et al., supra, of making “non-sensical” arguments). 
 52. See Azar et al., supra note 3, at 1514 (using airlines to examine a broader theory of 
common ownership); Antón et al., supra note 4, at 48 tbl.2. 
 53. Azar et al., supra note 3, at 1516 tbl.1; see also id. at 1525 (“Note that American Air-
lines’ top-seven shareholders (who jointly control 49.55% of the stock) are also among the top 
10 investors of Southwest Airlines and various other competitors. Similarly, each of Southwest’s 
top-six shareholders is among the top 10 shareholders of American and Delta, and five of them 
are among the top 10 holders of United as well.”). 
 54. Id. at 1516. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1517–18. 
 57. Id. at 1559. For more on this economic concept, see, for example, Supply and Demand, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.britannica.com/topic/supply-and-
demand (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 58. See Azar et al., supra note 3, at 1559. 
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pervades the airline industry, reducing competition further. And when com-
petition is reduced, consumers face fewer options and steeper prices—exactly 
what antitrust law is supposed to address. 
II. SOURCES OF ANTITRUST AGENCIES’ RELUCTANCE TO ADDRESS COMMON 
OWNERSHIP 
Though common ownership has emerged as an important competitive 
problem in the airline industry, antitrust regulators have stopped short of reg-
ulating the practice. With traditional antitrust law’s application to common 
ownership unclear, regulators have been hesitant to enact proactive rules ad-
dressing it. This Part explores the reasons—both legal (why agencies might 
lack authority to regulate) and prudential (why agencies might prefer not to 
regulate)—for that hesitation. Section II.A covers the DOJ’s ability to address 
common ownership through the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Section II.B ex-
plores the FTC and the DOT’s authority to address practices outside of the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts through their ability to address “unfair methods of 
competition.” Section II.C traces the DOT’s prior regulation of competitive 
practices that lie on the boundaries of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 
A. Limits of the Sherman and Clayton Acts 
Though common ownership causes competitive harm within the airline 
industry, two aspects of the practice make it difficult to regulate within the 
conventional boundaries of the Sherman and Clayton Acts: courts’ emphasis 
on showing a “mechanism of harm” and an exception to the Clayton Act for 
investors. This Section covers those aspects in turn. 
First, the nebulous nature of the competitive harm caused by common 
ownership makes the Sherman and Clayton Acts difficult to apply. Since at 
least Twombly,59 courts have required antitrust enforcers to show the specific 
method by which a business practice harms competition in order to bring suit 
under the Sherman Act.60 If regulators bring an enforcement action but can-
not prove a specific method by which a common owner is reducing competi-
tion (like telling executives not to compete or structuring executive pay to 
dissuade competition), then courts are likely to dismiss the suit.61 Such overt 
 
 59. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 548–49 (2007) (holding that antitrust law-
suits must be dismissed if they only contain bare allegations of anticompetitive behavior). 
 60. Thomas A. Lambert, The Roberts Court and the Limits of Antitrust, 52 B.C. L. REV. 
871, 928 (2011). 
 61. See Common Minority Interests, supra note 9, at 52:30; William H. Rooney, Co-chair, 
Antitrust & Competition Prac. Grp., Willke Farr & Gallagher LLP, Remarks at FTC Hearing, 
supra note 10, at 245. 
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acts are hard to identify.62 In fact, the most likely method is not any overt ac-
tion but instead “selective omission,” whereby common owners simply de-
cline to encourage corporations to compete as hard as independent owners 
would.63 Consequently, the DOJ and others suing under the Sherman Act may 
be prevented from addressing common ownership in many cases. 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act specifically prohibits stockholders from using 
stock acquisitions to reduce competition,64 so it could provide an avenue for 
regulators looking to address common ownership even if the Sherman Act 
would not apply. But section 7 provides a carve-out for stock that is acquired 
solely for investment, 65 which throws its applicability to common ownership 
into question. Professor Elhauge has argued that because institutional inves-
tors still exercise voting power and control through their stock, the Clayton 
Act should apply to common owners who are institutional investors.66 But 
since institutional investors are often more concerned about making a return 
on investment than about controlling the corporations themselves, other 
scholars have disagreed or noted lasting questions about the applicability of 
the Clayton Act.67 Resolving this disagreement is outside of the scope of this 
Note, but its presence suggests another issue the DOJ may face in suing com-
mon owners under the Clayton Act. 
Beyond these legal questions lie concerns about the method by which the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts must be enforced: through the courts. The DOJ 
may not use notice-and-comment rulemaking to regulate antitrust behavior; 
instead, it must bring action in court.68 But courts are often far from ideal ad-
judicators of antitrust issues given that economic analysis is required.69 This 
is especially true when courts are confronted with cutting-edge theories of an-
titrust harm. For example, in the early 2000s the FTC discovered that phar-
maceutical companies were paying generic manufacturers to delay 
 
 62. See Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 51, at 1399–400. But see Nathan Shekita, Interven-
tions by Common Owners, SSRN (Dec. 15, 2020), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3658726 
[perma.cc/6RR3-9PX3] (finding thirty examples of common owners using overt actions to en-
courage anticompetitive conduct in a recent study). 
 63. Hemphill & Kahan, supra note 51, at 1427–28. 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
 65. Id. (“No person shall acquire . . . the stock or other share capital . . . where in any line 
of commerce . . . the effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock 
by the voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or 
tend to create a monopoly. This section shall not apply to persons purchasing such stock solely 
for investment . . . .”). 
 66. Elhauge, supra note 8, at 1305–08. 
 67. Common Minority Interests, supra note 9, at 30:00, 52:00. But see Azar et al., supra 
note 3, at 1520 (arguing that institutional investors are becoming more activist). 
 68. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (permitting the DOJ to enforce the Sherman Act only in the courts); 
ELHAUGE, supra note 15, at 11–12, 12 n.11. 
 69. See Hemphill, supra note 25, at 673–75. 
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challenging their drug patents. 70 When the FTC sued to stop these “pay for 
delay” arrangements, courts of appeals held that “pay for delay” was not a tra-
ditionally recognized mechanism of harm and allowed the arrangements to 
continue. “Pay for delay” arrangements cost consumers $60 billion in higher 
drug prices.71 As this example shows, the DOJ and private parties may be pre-
vented from enforcing the antitrust laws by courts unfriendly to new theories 
of antitrust harm. 
The DOJ may face an uphill battle countering the competitive harm com-
mon ownership causes: it is difficult to identify how common ownership 
harms competition, the Clayton Act exempts passive investors, and courts are 
hostile to new economic arguments. Because common ownership sits on the 
boundaries of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, agencies able to prosecute “un-
fair methods of competition”—like the FTC and the DOT—may have an eas-
ier path to regulation. 
B. “Unfair Methods of Competition” 
Both section 5 of the FTC Act and section 411(a) of the Federal Aviation 
Act authorize their respective enforcement agencies to regulate “unfair meth-
ods of competition.” Courts have said that the language in those acts is 
broader than that of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.72 But it is not clear how 
much broader that authorization is, which is key to determining whether the 
FTC or the DOT can lawfully regulate common ownership. This Section ex-
amines how courts have treated attempts by the FTC and the DOT to regulate 
conduct outside of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 
The scope of the FTC’s section 5 powers has narrowed over time. Until 
the 1970s, courts allowed the FTC to regulate conduct solely on section 5 
grounds, without even considering its relationship to the Sherman and Clay-
ton Acts.73 In 1966, the Supreme Court held that “the Commission has power 
under § 5 to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency without proof that they 
amount to an outright violation” of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.74 Though 
the Supreme Court has maintained that section 5 extends beyond the Sherman 
 
 70. For more on this issue, see generally FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY 
PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/docu-
ments/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-
commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf [perma.cc/XC7W-T47D]. 
 71. Our Curious Amalgam, What’s Ahead in Pharmaceutical Antitrust Enforcement? Tak-
ing Stock of Key Pharmaceutical Issues and Enforcement Actions, A.B.A., at 8:00 (Aug. 31, 2020), 
https://podcast.ourcuriousamalgam.com/episode/76-whats-ahead-pharmaceutical-antitrust-
enforcement-key-issues-enforcement-actions [perma.cc/HS5A-KY79]. 
 72. See supra notes 25, 32 and accompanying text. 
 73. See Zeisler, supra note 33, at 275–76; Atl. Refin. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369–70 
(1965). 
 74. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966). 
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and Clayton Acts,75 in practice courts of appeals have limited the FTC’s au-
thority by requiring it to prove that business practices were causing actual or 
potential harm. 76 The FTC thrice attempted to use section 5 to prosecute con-
duct outside of the Sherman and Clayton Acts in the 1980s; each time, it lost 
at the court of appeals.77 
In Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC,78 the FTC challenged a company 
listing airline flights for refusing to deal with certain airlines, potentially mak-
ing it harder for those airlines to compete.79 The Second Circuit rebuffed the 
FTC, holding that section 5 did not cover situations when companies refused 
to deal with rivals since antitrust laws do not impose a duty on companies to 
deal with rivals.80 The court concluded that this challenge failed to comport 
with the general thrust of antitrust law because the FTC conceded the chal-
lenge was “outside the mainstream of law concerning monopolies and mo-
nopolization.”81 Official Airline Guides, then, created a limit on the FTC’s 
ability to define what an “unfair method” was by requiring the FTC to relate 
the method back to the general principles of antitrust law. 
Next, in Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC,82 the FTC challenged a plywood 
manufacturing pricing system that it believed was reducing competition in 
freight in some plywood markets. 83 The Ninth Circuit found that the FTC did 
not present sufficient evidence to show that the pricing system was actually 
harming competition and rejected the FTC’s argument that it need not find 
direct evidence of competitive harm because of the breadth of section 5.84 The 
FTC could not simply allege that rivals colluded; rather, “the Commission 
must demonstrate that the challenged pricing system has actually had the ef-
fect of fixing or stabilizing prices.”85 The Ninth Circuit stressed the complete 
lack of evidence presented by the FTC and, while noting that the FTC could 
prosecute “incipient threat[s] to competition,” found that the FTC had not 
 
 75. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986). The Supreme Court has 
reached this conclusion by looking at the language and the history of the FTC Act. FTC v. Sperry 
& Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972). The use of the broad term “unfair” gave the FTC 
broad discretion to determine what conduct fell under the purview of section 5, and the legisla-
tive history surrounding the FTC Act evinced Congress’s desire that the FTC enjoy broader 
powers than the DOJ. Id. at 241–44. 
 76. Adam Speegle, Note, Antitrust Rulemaking as a Solution to Abuse of the Standard-
Setting Process, 110 MICH. L. REV. 847, 858 (2012). 
 77. Id. at 859. 
 78. 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980). For a brief discussion on refusals to deal, see infra notes 
117–119 and accompanying text. 
 79. Off. Airline Guides, 630 F.2d at 922–23. 
 80. Id. at 927–28. 
 81. Id. at 925 (quoting Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 95 F.T.C. 1, 76 (1980)). 
 82. 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 83. Boise Cascade, 637 F.2d at 574. 
 84. Id. at 580–82. 
 85. Id. at 577. 
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shown any incipient threat.86 So while Boise Cascade affirmed the reach of the 
“unfair methods of competition” provision as going further than the Sherman 
and Clayton Acts (by including incipient threats), it required the FTC to show 
actual evidence of current or incipient threats. 
Finally, in E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC (Ethyl), 87 the FTC chal-
lenged a host of practices by gasoline-additives manufacturers that, according 
to the FTC, were keeping prices artificially high.88 The FTC explicitly asserted 
that though the practices did not violate the Sherman and Clayton Acts, they 
fell under the reach of section 5 as “conduct that, because of the market struc-
ture and conditions . . . substantially lessens competition.” 89 The Second Cir-
cuit, though recognizing the FTC’s broad section 5 enforcement authority, 
held that the FTC had to show “at least some indicia of oppressiveness” (that 
is, indications of anticompetitive harm) to regulate otherwise legal business 
conduct—and that the FTC did not make that showing. 90 Ethyl, like Boise Cas-
cade, required the FTC to make findings of anticompetitive harm for conduct 
to fall under section 5, even as it maintained that the scope of section 5 ex-
tended beyond that of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 
Though all three cases endorsed the FTC’s general ability to use section 5 
outside of the context of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, they limited the scope 
of section 5 by requiring the FTC to make findings of harm similar to those 
the DOJ must show to bring suit under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Be-
cause the FTC has not challenged practices that violate section 5 but not the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts since Ethyl, no other courts have considered the 
issue. 91 
On top of this appellate case law increasing the FTC’s burden in section 5 
cases, Congress further limited the scope of section 5 by amendment in 1994. 
Under the amendment, section 5 only covers practices that cause “substantial 
injury” that are “not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves” and not 
“outweighed by countervailing benefits.” 92 Some, but not all, commentators 
have interpreted the case law and statutory change to mean that section 5 no 
longer extends beyond the Sherman and Clayton Acts.93 At the very least, this 
 
 86. Id. at 582. 
 87. 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 88. Ethyl, 729 F.2d at 133. 
 89. Id. at 135. 
 90. Id. at 137–41. 
 91. Zeisler, supra note 33, at 279. 
 92. ELHAUGE, supra note 15, at 12 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)). 
 93. Compare Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72 AN-
TITRUST L.J. 761, 766 (2005) (suggesting that the Sherman and Clayton Acts no longer contain 
gaps that need to be filled by section 5 of the FTC Act), and Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Section 5 of 
the FTC Act: Principles of Navigation, 2 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 1, 4 (2014) (noting disagreement 
among FTC commissioners and concluding “that if you are sailing beyond the chart, here be 
dragons”), with Joseph P. Bauer, Reflections on the Manifold Means of Enforcing the Antitrust 
Laws: Too Much, Too Little, or Just Right?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 303, 305 (2004) (arguing 
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amendment now requires the FTC to make findings of competitive harm and 
balance those against “countervailing benefits” before bringing suit under sec-
tion 5. 
In contrast, the DOT’s attempt to use the “unfair method of competi-
tion” 94 provision in section 411(a) of the Federal Aviation Act was met with 
judicial approval in Judge Richard Posner’s United Air Lines decision. United 
Air Lines considered a set of Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) rules that limited 
certain practices by ticketing companies. 95 Judge Posner upheld the rules, 
considering it well-established law that “the Board can forbid anticompetitive 
practices before they become serious enough to violate the Sherman Act.” 96 
Judge Posner distinguished these practices from the ones in Ethyl, noting that 
the ticketing practices were “close enough” to the Sherman and Clayton Acts’ 
purview to be able to be enforced—given that the practices sounded in “tradi-
tional methods of illegal monopolization.” 97 
Posner’s 1985 opinion approving the broader reach of section 411 pre-
dated the 1994 amendment to the FTC Act, and the breadth of section 411 has 
not been litigated since. But general statutory-interpretation principles sug-
gest that section 411 is broader than the amended section 5. The textual canon 
of in pari materia (statutes addressing the same subject should be interpreted 
together) applies: because Congress included express limits on the conduct 
captured by section 5, the lack of express limits on section 411 should mean 
that those limits do not apply. 98 Further, the fact that Congress passed legisla-
tion limiting section 5 without corresponding legislation to limit section 411 
could reflect intent to keep the DOT’s section 411 powers broad. 99 
In recent years, the DOT has defined its section 411 power as covering 
practices “(1) that violate the antitrust laws, (2) that are not yet serious enough 
to violate the antitrust laws but may well do so if left unchecked, or (3) that 
violate antitrust principles even if they do not violate the letter of the antitrust 
 
that section 5 of the FTC Act encompasses not only the Sherman and Clayton Acts but also 
incipient antitrust violations). 
 94. 49 U.S.C. § 41712(a). 
 95. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Civ. Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d 1107, 1109–10 (7th Cir. 1985). 
The CAB issued the rules, but by the time the case was decided, the CAB had been disbanded 
and its authorities transferred to the DOT. Id. For more on these ticketing systems, known as 
CRSs, see infra Section II.C.1. 
 96. United Air Lines, 766 F.2d at 1114. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 467–69 (2001) (reasoning that 
because cost was expressly mentioned in other parts of the statute but not the one at issue, cost 
could not be considered in the provision at issue). 
 99. Cf. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 353–54 (2013) (stating that 
Congress’s choice of words is presumed to be deliberate, as are “its structural choices” to “delib-
erately . . . omit[]” changes to one section of code while altering another). 
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laws.” 100 This framework shows the scope of conduct covered by section 411: 
it is broader than the Sherman and Clayton Acts, but not so broad as to allow 
the DOT to address undesirable but competitive conduct. Rather, conduct 
that is close to the Sherman and Clayton Acts—as a violation of antitrust prin-
ciples or as an incipient violation of antitrust laws—is also covered. How close 
that conduct must be is still up for debate, given the relative lack of case law 
on the issue. But conduct that can be analogized to actual theories of compet-
itive harm is likely to be covered, whereas conduct that falls outside of main-
stream theories of harm is likely not covered. 
On a final note, section 411 also expands the methods by which the DOT 
can regulate competition. Case law and historical practice suggest that notice-
and-comment rulemaking is within the DOT’s purview. United Air Lines, the 
only case to consider the DOT’s rulemaking authority, held that section 411 
authorized antitrust notice-and-comment rules. 101 Following the decision, the 
DOT used notice-and-comment rulemaking for nearly two decades. 102 The 
ability to engage in rulemaking expands the DOT’s authority beyond that of 
other agencies, as the Sherman and Clayton Acts do not permit the DOJ to 
enact notice-and-comment rules, 103 and the FTC’s authority to do so is un-
clear. 104 
The “unfair methods of competition” provisions of the FTC Act and Fed-
eral Aviation Act provide a wider scope for the FTC and the DOT to prosecute 
anticompetitive conduct than the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Though the ex-
act limits on these agencies remain unclear due to the small number of cases 
considering these provisions, the DOT appears to have a greater scope under 
section 411 than the FTC does under section 5, and the DOT may regulate 
practices that violate antitrust laws or principles, as well as incipient threats to 
competition. How the DOT has used that authority will be discussed below. 
C. History of the DOT’s Approach to Antitrust Enforcement 
The DOT has the clearest authority of any agency to address common 
ownership in the airline industry, but its role in regulating the practice has 
 
 100. Delta Air Lines, Inc., Order No. 2004-6-17, DOT-OST-1998-4776-0009 (U.S. Dep’t 
of Transp. June 21, 2004), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/2004-6-
17.pdf [perma.cc/G3MR-YAL5]. 
 101. United Air Lines, 766 F.2d at 1111–12. The FTC has never attempted to promulgate 
antitrust rules under section 5. ELHAUGE, supra note 15, at 12 & n.11. 
 102. See infra Section II.C.1. 
 103. See Zeisler, supra note 33, at 268–71. 
 104. The FTC Act made clear that the FTC could promulgate rules for consumer protec-
tion, but it did not address—either to endorse or prohibit—the FTC’s ability to promulgate rules 
for “unfair methods of competition.” ELHAUGE, supra note 15, at 12 n.11 (“[T]here were insuf-
ficient . . . votes [in Congress] for either the proposition that the FTC could enact rules defining 
anticompetitive practices or the proposition that it could not.”). 
142 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 120:125 
largely been overlooked. This lack of attention may stem from the DOT’s hes-
itancy to use its section 411 authority beyond the narrower Sherman and Clay-
ton Acts. This Section discusses the only two instances 105 of the DOT using its 
section 411 authority to proactively set antitrust policies: ticketing rules and a 
proposed policy on predatory pricing. 
1. CRS Rules 
This Section covers the CAB’s introduction of rules governing airline 
ticketing processes, which were the first substantive antitrust rules issued after 
deregulation. Ticketing platforms—known as “computer reservation systems” 
(CRSs)—emerged in the 1970s as a way for travel agents to book their clients’ 
flights via computer. But airlines manipulated their CRSs to prefer their own 
flights by placing competitors’ flights lower on the page, charging competitors 
higher booking fees, and excluding competitors. 106 Smaller airlines com-
plained that the practices were stifling competition and requested that regula-
tors intervene. 107 The CAB found that the practices met the standard for 
monopolizing conduct under section 2 of the Sherman Act, meaning that they 
would be unlawful under section 411 as well. Accordingly, it proposed rules 
to prohibit many of the offending practices. 108 
The proposed rules met resistance from CRS-owning airlines, which ar-
gued that the rules punished them simply for having the foresight to create 
CRSs in the first place. 109 Nevertheless, the rules were adopted and survived a 
legal challenge in 1985. 110 In 1992, the DOT readopted the rules, which had 
been set to expire in 1990.111 But by the 2000s, with the airlines having spun 
 
 105. The DOT has also worked with the FAA to propose rules regulating competition for 
takeoff and landing time slots, known as “slot pairs,” at New York airports. See Slot Management 
and Transparency for LaGuardia Airport, John F. Kennedy International Airport, and Newark 
Liberty International Airport, 80 Fed. Reg. 1247 (proposed Jan. 8, 2015); Benjamin Berlin & 
Graham Keithley, Asserting Broad Authority or Circumventing Deregulation? FAA’s Proposed 
Regulation of New York Airport Slot Transactions, 28 AIR & SPACE LAW., no. 3, 2015, at 1, 15. 
But because these rules were so geographically narrow and tied to the FAA, they are not dis-
cussed here. At any rate, the rules were withdrawn before being implemented. See Slot Manage-
ment and Transparency for LaGuardia Airport, John F. Kennedy International Airport, and 
Newark Liberty International Airport, 81 Fed. Reg. 30,218 (May 16, 2016). 
 106. Alexander & Lee, supra note 24, at 379–80. 
 107. Id. at 379, 386; see also Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. 
11,644 (proposed Mar. 27, 1984). 
 108. Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,646–47. 
 109. Alexander & Lee, supra note 24, at 379–80 (noting the complaint of American Airlines 
CEO Robert Crandall). 
 110. See Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,644; United 
Air Lines, Inc. v. Civ. Aeronautics Bd., 766 F.2d 1107, 1122 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.); see also 
supra notes 95–97, 101–102 and accompanying text. 
 111. Carrier-Owned Computer Reservations Systems, 49 Fed. Reg. at 11,669; Computer 
Reservations System (CRS) Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 976, 977–78 (Jan. 7, 2004). 
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off their CRSs into private companies,112 pressure from industry lawyers 113 
and the libertarian Mercatus Center114 convinced the DOT that CRS regulations 
were harming innovation, and most of the rules were allowed to expire.115 
These rules exceeded the widely accepted scope of the Sherman and Clay-
ton Acts in two ways. First, though section 411 allowed the CAB to issue no-
tice-and-comment rules governing competition, the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts do not give the DOJ a similar power. 116 Second, some of the conduct reg-
ulated by the rules—such as refusals to deal with rivals—now appears to be at 
the boundaries of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. The CAB’s assertion that 
CRS practices violated section 2 of the Sherman Act was in line with jurispru-
dence at the time; in a key 1985 case, the Supreme Court held that the Sherman 
Act prohibited companies with monopoly power and access to essential re-
sources from refusing to deal with competitors. 117 But in 2004, soon after the 
CRS rules expired, the Supreme Court narrowed those prohibitions to just a 
few specific circumstances.118 Under current jurisprudence, it is unclear 
 
 112. American, Continental, and United Airlines spun off their CRS platforms into sepa-
rate companies between 1999 and 2001; by 2003, no airline owned a CRS. This dampened the 
incentive for CRSs to bias results in favor of certain airlines. Alexander & Lee, supra note 24, at 
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whether airlines’ exclusionary conduct would even fall within the reach of the 
Sherman Act. 119 
2. Predatory Pricing Policy 
The DOT’s last major foray to the boundaries of the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts came in the late 1990s, when the DOT sought to address predatory pric-
ing. In the 1990s, several low-cost airlines notified the DOT of predatory be-
havior by legacy carriers that had forced them out of new city-pair markets. 120 
Low-cost airlines sued legacy airlines, winning two eight-figure settlements. 121 
The DOT, relying on section 411, proposed an enforcement policy that lim-
ited how much airlines could cut prices in certain markets. The enforcement 
policy was not a notice-and-comment rule, but rather a policy statement in-
dicating when the DOT would challenge a specific practice. 122 The policy pro-
hibited price cuts in response to another airline’s entry into the market if one 
of two conditions were met: first, the price cuts could not cut the original air-
line’s revenue by more than the airline would have lost because of the new 
entrant; 123 second, the price cuts could not reduce the original airline’s short-
run profits in that city pair more than a strategy of reasonable competition 
with the new airline would. 124 
Airline executives, libertarian think tanks, and airline-funded institutions 
waged a public-relations campaign against the rules, claiming that they were 
preventing airlines from offering low fares. 125 Eventually, Congress required 
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the Transportation Research Board to study the policy. That study criticized 
the policy for being difficult to administer and potentially discouraging be-
nign conduct; it also cast doubt on the DOT’s efficacy as an agency in enforc-
ing antitrust laws as compared to the DOJ. 126 The DOT withdrew the policy 
in 2001, resolving to pursue predatory behavior on a case-by-case basis. 127 The 
withdrawal was based on market considerations rather than concerns about 
the DOT’s authority under section 411 to enact the policy. 128 
Like the ticketing rules, the proposed policy would have governed con-
duct at the boundaries of the Sherman Act. According to the Supreme Court, 
predatory pricing only violates the Sherman Act when a firm prices its prod-
ucts below cost and has a “dangerous probability” of recouping its short-term 
losses through increased market power.129 In fact, the DOJ’s attempt to pros-
ecute American Airlines for predatory pricing was rebuffed by the Tenth Cir-
cuit in United States v. AMR Corp., as the DOJ could not show that American 
was pricing fares below cost.130 The DOT policy, however, would have allowed 
the DOT to prosecute conduct in certain circumstances in which an airline 
priced flights above cost, going beyond the Tenth Circuit’s construction of the 
Sherman Act (as guided by Supreme Court precedent).131 
The DOT’s predatory-pricing policy showed both the potential of, and 
the difficulty with, broader section 411 regulation. The DOT tried to expand 
the scope of section 411 beyond the Sherman and Clayton Acts, endorsing an 
approach disfavored by the Supreme Court in a Sherman Act context, and 
later rejected by the Tenth Circuit, with little worry about overstepping its le-
gal mandate. But it stopped short of regulation, instead bowing to pro-indus-
try political pressure. 
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While outside forces convinced the DOT to withdraw its attempts to use 
section 411 at the boundaries of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the more tell-
ing sign of the DOT’s ethos of relaxed regulation is just how rarely it has at-
tempted to use section 411. The two attempts detailed above are a far cry from 
the DOT’s consumer-protection activities,132 which have resulted in the DOT 
winning judgments against airlines and changing airline practices.133 Tell-
ingly, the DOT itself sometimes neglects to mention that antitrust enforce-
ment is part of its job under section 411.134 It is no wonder that antitrust 
scholars and practitioners have overlooked the DOT when debating how to 
regulate anticompetitive practices like common ownership. In sum, the 
DOT’s reticence to enforce the antitrust laws is less a legal issue than one of 
political will and enforcement preference. When it has ventured into antitrust 
enforcement, its legal authority has been upheld. 
III. SECTION 411’S ABILITY TO REDUCE HARMS FROM COMMON OWNERSHIP 
The DOT should use its section 411 authority to address anticompetitive 
practices and protect consumers participating in the airline industry. Because 
these anticompetitive practices are beyond the reach of the Sherman and Clay-
ton Acts, the DOT is empowered to take enforcement and regulatory actions 
that the DOJ cannot. Common ownership presents a key opportunity for the 
DOT to do so. 
The historical lack of regulation of common ownership in airlines shows 
why DOT action is needed. Regulatory action is necessary because high levels 
of common ownership in the airline industry lead to anticompetitive con-
duct.135 Still, due to common owners’ use of implicit mechanisms to reduce 
competition and the passive-investment exception of the Clayton Act, com-
mon ownership is not universally accepted as within the scope of the Sherman 
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and Clayton Acts. 136 In the past, when the DOT was confronted with anticom-
petitive conduct lurking on the boundaries of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 
it shied away from enforcement.137 But now political actors across the federal 
government are taking a renewed interest in the importance of government 
regulation to curb competitive abuses, including Transportation Secretary 
Pete Buttigieg.138 With the practice of common ownership, the DOT should 
take an active role in regulation. 
This Part explores how and why the DOT should attempt to limit the 
competitive harm caused by commonly owned airlines. Section III.A covers 
the DOT’s legal authority to promulgate notice-and-comment rules against 
common ownership. Section III.B specifically proposes that the DOT employ 
the “market-share rule.” Section III.C shows why the DOT’s adoption of the 
market-share rule is the best path forward to limit the anticompetitive effects 
of common ownership. 
A. The DOT’s Authority to Promulgate Notice-and-Comment Rules for 
Common Ownership 
The DOT should look to regulate common ownership of airlines through 
a notice-and-comment rule. Unlike other agencies with an antitrust mandate, 
the DOT has clear authority to address common ownership. And the DOT 
can more effectively regulate common owners through notice-and-comment 
rules, instead of depending on courts for adjudication. Both issues will be dis-
cussed in turn. 
An agency promulgating a notice-and-comment rule regarding an anti-
competitive practice must show that it has the authority both to regulate that 
practice specifically and to promulgate rules generally.139 As explained in Sec-
tion II.A, the DOJ may have difficulty showing that its purview encompasses 
common ownership due to the limits of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.140 But 
the DOT does have the authority to address this practice because common 
ownership and control fall squarely within the reach of the judicially defined 
scope of section 411. The DOT may regulate practices that are “incipient vio-
lations” of antitrust laws as well as those violating antitrust principles as “un-
fair methods of competition.”141 Common ownership is an incipient violation 
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because collusive behavior is more likely when common owners are allowed 
to invest and control competing firms without restriction.142 Common own-
ership also violates the antitrust principle of guarding against one rival taking 
partial ownership of another.143 
DOT common-ownership regulations would also be legally sound be-
cause common ownership is largely distinguishable from cases such as Official 
Airline Guides, Boise Cascade, and Ethyl in which courts rejected the FTC’s 
attempts to regulate beyond the Sherman and Clayton Acts.144 In the airline 
common-ownership context, the DOT could show evidence of competitive 
harm and incipiency. In contrast to the air travel companies refusing to deal 
with rivals in Official Airline Guides, regulating common ownership is not 
“outside the mainstream.”145 It may exist at the fringes of the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts, but there is a colorable argument that the Acts themselves would 
apply to common ownership because it is behavior that limits competition 
through collusion.146 Furthermore, a court need not decide that common 
ownership is, in fact, covered by the Sherman and Clayton Acts; it need only 
find that the practice is “close enough” to those theories of harm to sustain the 
proposed DOT rule.147 Here, it clearly is, as the practice is at least close to col-
lusion. Collusion among rivals is one of the chief harms of antitrust law.148 
Common ownership is related to collusion since it both facilitates collusive 
practices and creates the same effect—reduced competition—that collusive 
practices create.149 
The DOT would also have historical precedent for addressing common 
ownership, because it depended on section 411 authority in previous attempts 
to regulate at the boundaries of the Sherman and Clayton Acts—namely, its 
CRS rules and proposed predatory pricing actions.150 A rule on common own-
ership would share many similarities with the DOT’s proposed policy on 
predatory pricing, in that it would seek to regulate a possible antitrust problem 
in its incipiency—even when many have questioned the specific mechanism 
by which the practice reduces competition. The DOT continued to take a 
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broad view of its legal authority under section 411 even as it withdrew the 
policy: it cited market conditions, rather than legal authority, as the reason for 
the withdrawal.151 The abandonment of the CRS rules was likewise based on 
the DOT’s assessment of market conditions instead of legal limitations.152 
Thus, the same authority underlying the DOT’s CRS and predatory pricing 
actions would extend to a common ownership rule, giving the DOT clear au-
thority where the DOJ’s power is murky. 
In fact, it is not just permissible for the DOT to take a broad view of its 
section 411 authority to address common ownership; the DOT has a legal re-
sponsibility to take such a view. Congress granted the DOT antitrust jurisdic-
tion in the Federal Aviation Act and affirmed that grant of jurisdiction even 
while disbanding the CAB.153 Congress then declined to limit the DOT’s au-
thority even as it limited the FTC’s jurisdiction.154 In short, Congress intended 
for the DOT to enforce antitrust law. To the extent that the DOT passes on 
enforcement, waiting on other agencies or the market to handle the issue, it 
contravenes the will of Congress. 
The DOT has the power to promulgate a rule on common ownership 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking. This informal rulemaking pro-
cess—which the DOT (or possibly the FTC) but not the DOJ has the power to 
carry out155—would allow for the transfer of adjudicative power from the 
courts to the agency in this area. By putting the agency in charge of addressing 
common ownership, the DOT could guard against courts’ inconsistent adju-
dication of antitrust cases and make adjudication more efficient. Rulemaking 
also provides the DOT an extra layer of authority, since the agency would be 
entitled to at least some form of deference for an interpretation of section 411 
that covers common ownership.156 Notice-and-comment rulemaking would 
allow the DOT to more effectively address common ownership and would 
bolster its legal authority to do so under section 411. 
In sum, this Section has shown that the broad purview of section 411 al-
lows the DOT to address common ownership, even if the practice does not 
violate the Sherman and Clayton Acts. And previous Sections have shown that 
the DOT—perhaps uniquely—has the power to promulgate notice-and-com-
ment antitrust rules. These powers provide the DOT a clear legal path to 
promulgating a rule addressing common ownership in the airline industry. 
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B. How the Market-Share Rule Appropriately Addresses Common 
Ownership of Airlines 
The DOT can take meaningful action to limit competitive harm from 
common ownership in airlines by promulgating a notice-and-comment rule 
based on the recently developed “market-share rule.” This Section explains 
how the market-share rule works and how the DOT could apply it as a notice-
and-comment rule for airlines. 
The market-share rule is a proposal for limiting competitive harm from 
common ownership developed by legal scholars and practitioners Eric Posner, 
Fiona Scott Morton, and Glen Weyl.157 The rule would prohibit institutional 
investors and individual shareholders with shares of “more than a single ef-
fective firm in an oligopoly” from owning more than 1% of the market share 
unless the entity holding shares is a freestanding index fund that commits to 
being purely passive.158 Purely passive investors are investors that can only 
hold more than 1% of multiple companies in an oligopoly if they disclaim the 
ability to vote their shares and communicate with corporate officials.159 
The market-share-rule authors did not discuss the DOT in advocating for 
the rule; nevertheless, it could be easily applied to airlines. Since the airline 
industry is an oligopoly,160 the DOT would implement this rule by prohibiting 
investment firms from owning more than 1% of multiple airlines unless they 
completely waive their ability to influence the corporation. This would reduce 
anticompetitive incentives since each firm would be controlled only by inves-
tors who either have no financial stake in rival airlines or have no control over 
the company’s competitive conduct. Investors, meanwhile, could still remain 
in the industry and exercise control—so long as they do so over just one firm. 
And investors with significant shares over more than one firm in the industry 
could not control either firm, either by exercising voting power to incentivize 
lax competition or by communicating with corporate officials like CEOs, di-
rectors, or managers to dissuade competition.161 The market-share rule, then, 
would give the DOT an effective method to control common ownership while 
still allowing institutional investors to invest in airlines. 
By addressing only the airline industry, a DOT market-share rule would 
minimize the overregulation concerns that accompany the generalized mar-
ket-share rule. Critics of the market-share rule have argued that it would make 
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investment more risky by taking away investors’ ability to minimize risk by 
investing in multiple firms in one industry.162 Posner, Scott Morton, and Weyl 
maintain that their rule would still allow investors to minimize risk, since in-
vesting in multiple firms in the same industry does not reduce risk nearly as 
much as investing in different industries.163 If the market-share rule does in-
crease the risk of investing, whole-cloth regulation of the practice might upset 
the investments of millions of Americans.164 But because airlines make up 
only a small proportion of institutional investors’ total portfolios, regulating 
only airlines would not significantly impact institutional investors.165 Anti-
trust regulators could tinker with the market-share rule in the airline industry 
without expanding it to the rest of the economy. 
An airline-focused market-share rule could serve as an important step to-
ward cohesive regulation of common ownership throughout the economy. 
First, it would establish a role for enforcement agencies to play in limiting the 
effects of common ownership. And second, it would allow for a testing ground 
for some of the disputes that have arisen between scholars. Piloting the mar-
ket-share rule in the airline industry would answer important questions about 
whether the rule increases competition in a given market or makes investment 
more risky. If those answers point toward regulation being necessary, the DOJ 
and the FTC would have a greater incentive to address common ownership 
across more industries. Even though the DOJ could not establish a notice-and-
comment rule for common ownership and the FTC’s ability to do so is un-
clear, either agency could still address common ownership in industries where 
it is prevalent. 
C. The DOT Is the Right Agency to Enact the Market-Share Rule 
The previous Section explains how the market-share rule would work as 
applied by the DOT to airlines. This Section considers why this rule—under 
DOT direction—is the right way to govern airline common ownership on a 
practical level. Two reasons will be considered: market conditions that are ripe 
for a rule on common ownership, and other agencies’ hesitance to regulate. 
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First, market conditions in the airline industry are ripe for addressing com-
mon ownership. Antitrust law prevents firms from amassing market power, 
which firms can use to extract supracompetitive profits from the industry.166 
So dominant firms’ earning high (perhaps supracompetitive) profits tends to 
signal antitrust issues. Conversely, if the dominant firms in an industry are los-
ing money, that industry will be less likely to have firms with market power. 
Recent trends suggest that airline profitability is likely to remain high, 
suggesting that regulation is appropriate. After losing money overall from 
1980 to 2010,167 the industry reaped record profits during the 2010s.168 And 
though profits have nosedived during the COVID-19 pandemic,169 the indus-
try’s profit outlook remains strong.170 In fact, the drivers of airlines’ increased 
profitability since 2010 seem to be longer lasting: better-evolved business 
strategies, more efficient flight planning, and less competition.171 Airlines’ 
struggles since deregulation in 1978, then, do not explain the DOT’s lax anti-
trust enforcement since 2010. Further, financial struggles across an industry 
need not totally preclude antitrust enforcement within that industry, since an-
ticompetitive conduct may still exist. 172 So even if the airline industry faced 
the prospect of long-term losses, the DOT need not abandon antitrust en-
forcement. In sum, then, airline profitability suggests that regulation is appro-
priate, and enacting the market-share rule would address competitive harms 
from common ownership without driving airlines out of business. 
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Second, the DOT should enact the market-share rule because other agen-
cies have failed to effectively regulate common ownership in the airline indus-
try. In recent decades, the DOJ and the FTC have shied away from strong 
antitrust enforcement.173 That tendency has continued in the context of com-
mon ownership, in which the DOJ and the FTC have signaled that they prefer 
to continue researching the issue instead of taking action. 174 In fact, agencies’ 
hesitancy to address common ownership may be driven by political consider-
ations: As with the CRS rules and predatory pricing policy, industry groups 
and libertarian organizations have cautioned agencies against addressing 
common ownership, and DOJ and FTC inaction may be a signal of these 
groups’ success.175 
In a regulatory context where other agencies sit on the sidelines, the DOT 
should be unafraid to address common ownership. Its design—overlapping 
authority with the DOJ over airlines—allows it to pick up regulatory slack if 
the other agency falters.176 The DOT also brings industry expertise to crafting 
and managing a market-share rule: it studies the competitive effects of the air-
line industry at length,177 and it brings a wealth of industry knowledge that 
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may make up for its lack of antitrust-specific experience.178 The DOT has a 
unique role in addressing common ownership. 
This rule is even more critical when other agencies fail to take action. 
Scholars have advanced concerns about the DOT encroaching on the province 
of other antitrust agencies by enacting broad antitrust rules.179 The DOJ is 
thought to be a more discerning regulator, since it has a century of experience 
enforcing antitrust law and an entire section dedicated to transportation, en-
ergy, and agriculture.180 The DOJ also has more experience weighing costs and 
benefits in antitrust enforcement generally, and it alone handles airline mer-
gers.181 But deferring to the DOJ is impractical when the DOJ has declined to 
effectively address common ownership in airlines.182 
The DOT has clearer legal authority to regulate common ownership than 
the DOJ, and despite its relative lack of antitrust experience, it can step in and 
remedy the competitive harm caused by the practice. Given the scope of the 
potential harm to consumers—price increases of perhaps 7%183—regulatory 
steps are necessary. The DOT is the right agency to undertake them. 
The likeliest reasons for the DOT’s timidity in antitrust enforcement do 
not withstand scrutiny. The DOJ’s enforcement powers do not make the DOT 
redundant, worries about section 411’s narrow scope are unfounded, and the 
airline industry will not buckle under the weight of antitrust regulation. The 
DOT should be unafraid to take more proactive steps regulating anticompet-
itive practices—even when those practices are at the boundaries of the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts. 
CONCLUSION 
The DOT has the power and responsibility to address anticompetitive 
practices through section 411 of the Federal Aviation Act. Common owner-
ship is one such anticompetitive practice, and the DOT could limit its harm 
to consumers by adopting the market-share rule. Though the DOJ may be 
limited in addressing harms from common ownership and enacting proactive 
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rules to combat it, the DOT has broader jurisdiction to test new regulations 
within this space. Under section 411, the DOT can and should lead the charge 
toward effective regulation of the anticompetitive harms of common owner-
ship, which could ultimately recoup billions of dollars in the form of more 
competitive markets—stemming a wealth transfer from poorer consumers to 
wealthier investors.184 
The DOT has considered a more proactive role in antitrust enforcement 
in the past but has been dissuaded by political and prudential concerns.185 
Now, with rising airline profitability, 186 a better understanding of how the 
DOT can supplement (and not simply mimic) DOJ enforcement,187 and a po-
litical appetite for controlling monopoly power,188 the DOT should not shy 
away from more muscular antitrust enforcement. In fact, by refusing to regu-
late at the boundaries of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the DOT shirks its 
congressional mandate. 
In recent years, politicians and academics have started to realize the im-
mense effect that antitrust regulation—and the lack thereof—has on the U.S. 
economy and wealth distribution. But their calls for stronger antitrust laws 
and enforcement have largely overlooked the role of industry-specific agen-
cies like the DOT. It is more important than ever to reclaim the DOT’s role in 
antitrust: the DOT has been able to take a broader approach to antitrust reg-
ulation within the airline industry in the past, and it offers the clearest path to 
addressing recently understood practices like common ownership. The DOT 
has the tools to protect consumers against anticompetitive practices now and 
set up a stronger infrastructure for effective antitrust enforcement down the 
line. These tools should be put to use. 
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